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Since the end of 2015 Vlad Plahotniuc, an oligarch and the richest man in Moldova, leader 
of the ruling, nominally pro-European Democratic Party, has been de facto the only person 
who counts in Moldovan politics and business. He is an extremely unpopular politician who 
has been accused of transforming Moldova into a classic ‘captured state’. However, he has 
been forced to work with Igor Dodon, the country’s nominally opposition and pro-Russian 
President, who enjoys the most public trust, as well as with the Socialist party (PSRM) which 
stands behind him. Both politicians have created a particular system of government which 
is something like a political cartel. The parties which make it up are conducting a largely 
superficial ideological-political struggle which stirs up huge emotions and polarises society. 
The dominant role in the tandem is played by Plahotniuc, who is much more powerful, as he 
controls the government and the parliamentary majority, and is also the main beneficiary 
of the current system.
However, the system1 which has been creat-
ed in Moldova is highly unstable and should 
be seen as short-term in nature. The greatest 
threat to Plahotniuc in the near future comes 
from the parliamentary elections scheduled for 
the end of 2018. Given the PSRM’s high popu-
larity and the low levels of support for Plahot-
niuc and his party, the election will probably be 
won by the Socialists, who could form a par-
liamentary majority under President Dodon. For 
this reason, Plahotniuc has been conducting 
an intense campaign to improve the PDM’s abys-
mal poll ratings, and is working to undermine 
the prerogatives of the President. There is no 
doubt that tensions on the Moldovan political 
arena will accumulate over the coming months. 
1	 One	of	the	first	people	to	use	this	term	in	relation	to	the	
functioning of the current political system in Moldova 
was the Moldovan analyst and political commentator 
Igor Botan. http://independent.md/ Igor-botan-intre-do-
don-si-pd-exista-un-cartel-political-care-democratii-il-
ajuta-sa-scoata-din-circuitul-political-partidul-lui-usatii/
The upcoming parliamentary elections will de-
cide not only the shape of the current system, 
but also the business and political future of 
Vlad Plahotniuc.
Plahotniuc-Dodon: forced to cooperate 
Despite	his	extremely	broad	political	influence,	
his control over the state’s apparatus, his huge 
financial	resources,	many	media	assets	and	his	
own personal ambitions, Vlad Plahotniuc is not 
in a position to govern Moldova alone2. A key 
obstacle to the introduction of an authoritari-
an model of government is the marginal public 
support for him and his party. Only about 1-2% 
of the public support Plahotniuc, and fewer 
2 For more on Vlad Plahotniuc and the sources of his po-
litical	and	economic	power,	 see	Kamil	Całus,	Moldova:	
from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony, 
OSW Commentary, 11 April 2016, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-04-11/
moldova-oligarchic-pluralism-to-plahotniucs-hegemony
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than 5% of voters will vote for his PDM party3. 
In such conditions, he cannot afford to try and 
seize power in the country and openly reject the 
democratic model, as this could lead to violent 
resistance from the public. This scenario is also 
impossible because of the opinion of the West-
ern	partners	which	support	Moldova	financially	
and politically, and with whom Plahotniuc, as 
a nominally pro-European politician, must reck-
on with. As a result, the oligarch must main-
tain some semblance of democracy to preserve 
power, and so he has been forced to work with 
Igor Dodon, the most popular politician with 
the Moldovan public, and the Socialist party, 
which has around 50% popular support.
This cooperation, although forced, is based on 
a community of interests between these two 
politicians. Both the President and Plahotniuc 
have to maintain the functioning clan-oligar-
chic system which operates in the country. 
In practice, this means preventing any groups 
which could threaten its existence from coming 
to power, and avoiding real reforms that would 
undermine its political position and block the 
possible illegal income which both politicians 
can receive. Nevertheless, the current sys-
tem	–	even	though	 its	benefits	 to	Dodon	and 
Plahotniuc are only short-term – is not satisfac-
tory for either of them. Plahotniuc’s ultimate 
goal, in fact, is to gain complete control over 
the Moldovan political scene; Dodon’s ambition 
is	 to	gradually	extend	his	 influence	within	the	
framework of the existing system, and in the 
3 Data from the Public Opinion Barometer, regular, 
twice-yearly surveys by the Moldovan Public Policy Insti-
tute (Institutul de Politici Audience); http://bop.ipp.md/ro
long term, to subjugate or remove Plahotniuc 
from both politics and business.
Mutual benefits
The	greatest	beneficiary	of	this	model	of	gov-
ernment in its current form is Vlad Plahotniuc. 
The oligarch can encourage pro-European vot-
ers who distrust him and his party to vote for 
the PDM in the name of stopping the pro-Rus-
sian forces embodied by the ostentatiously 
pro-Russian Dodon. Just as importantly, the 
very popular president and his party have been 
exploited by Plahotniuc in talks with the coun-
try’s partners from the EU and the US. While 
they are aware of the oligarch’s true inten-
tions, the chance that pro-Russian forces could 
seize power in the country allows Plahotniuc to 
convince the West that only he, with his consid-
erable	media	and	financial	resources,	can	pro-
tect Moldova from taking a geopolitical turn 
towards Russia4. The West’s support for Plahot-
niuc is essential because it allows him access to 
financial	resources	and	legitimates	his	unpopu-
lar government.
Dodon, who has great public support and reg-
ularly meets Vladimir Putin, serves the oligarch 
both as a liaison and mediator, facilitating con-
tacts with the world of Russian business and 
politics5, as well as a kind of shield, prevent-
ing the Kremlin from taking hostile political 
and	economic	activities	 towards	Chişinău.	 For	
many months Plahotniuc, in order to lend cred-
4 Plahotniuc’s narrative is also very convenient for those 
EU politicians (especially from Romania) who are aware 
of the oligarch’s real interests and his actual attitudes 
towards reform, and support him for geopolitical, not 
ideological reasons.
5 One example of such activities is Dodon’s likely lobby-
ing, during a meeting with the President of Gazprom in 
January 2017, for Vasile Botnaru’s candidacy to become 
director of MoldovaGaz, the Moldovan monopoly com-
pany	in	the	field	of	import	and	distribution	of	gas,	most	
of whose shares belongs to Gazprom. Botnaru is a close 
associate	and	confidant	of	Plahotniuc.
http://unimedia.info/stiri/vrea-sa-puna-mana-pe-mol-
dovagaz-nastase-dodon-a-promovat-la-moscova-can-
didatul-lui-plahotniuc-pentru-sefia-acestei-intreprin-
deri-127442.html
Vlad Plahotniuc and Igor Dodon have 
created something like a political car-
tel, in which the parties they control are 
conducting a largely superficial ideologi-
cal-political struggle.
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ibility to his pro-Western image, win the favour 
of Western partners (particularly the Unit-
ed States) and strengthen the sense of threat 
from Russia (both externally and domestically), 
has been taking an unprecedentedly assertive 
line towards Moscow, as a result of which in 
2017 relations between the Moldovan and 
Russian governments have de facto frozen6. 
Despite this, the Kremlin has not actually un-
dertaken any serious retaliation7. It seems that 
one of the reasons for this political restraint, 
something rather unprecedented in Russian 
practice, is Moscow’s fear of damaging the im-
age of Igor Dodon, who is the key pro-Russian 
politician in Moldova. From the point of view 
of the government in the Kremlin, he offers the 
hope	that	he	might	take	full	power	in	Chişinău	
in the near future. 
The current political system also has short-term 
benefits	 for	Dodon.	First,	as	 the	 leader	of	 the	
opposition, and as a president with limited 
competence, he is de facto not expected to 
fulfil	his	election	promises,	and	can	focus	pri-
marily on image-building and criticising the 
government. Secondly, it seems certain that 
6 Back in March 2017, the Moldovan PM presented the 
Russian ambassador with a note in which he protest-
ed	against	how	Moldovan	officials	visiting	Moscow	had	
been	 treated.	 In	May,	 five	 Russian	diplomats	were	 ex-
pelled from Chisinau on charges of espionage. In Au-
gust,	 Chişinău	 announced	 declared	 Dmitry	 Rogozin,	
Russian deputy prime minister and the President of the 
Russian Federation’s special representative for Transnis-
tria, persona non grata.
7 The only response has been the expulsion in May 2017 
of	five	Moldovan	diplomats	in	retaliation.	Indirectly,	the	
issue by an investigative committee of the Russian Fed-
eration of an arrest warrant (essentially symbolic) for 
Plahotniuc on charges of murdering several people may 
be taken as a reaction to the government’s anti-Rus-
sian activities. See http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol-
icy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/
id/2772287
Dodon – like other senior Moldovan politi-
cians	–	is	deriving	unspecified	though	tangible	
financial	 benefits	 resulting	 from	 his	 coopera-
tion with Plahotniuc8. Although he constantly 
emphasises his opposition to the Democrats, 
Dodon has in fact regularly helped Plahotniuc’s 
party in forcing laws through parliament which 
are of essential importance to the oligarch. 
The most egregious example of this practice was 
the adoption by parliament (with the support 
of the Socialists) in May 2017 of a law chang-
ing the electoral system from a proportional to 
a mixed system, which increases the chances of 
Plahotniuc’s party obtaining a satisfactory re-
sult in the upcoming general elections. 
This	 stage-managed	 conflict	 between	 Plahot-
niuc’s Democrats and Dodon’s Socialists has 
pushed the non-parliamentary opposition to 
the margins of public debate; lacking adequate 
financial	 and	media	 resources,	 they	are	 effec-
tively unable to get their message to the public.
Weakening the president
The current arrangement between Plahotniuc 
and Dodon, while it is temporarily effective and 
beneficial	for	both	parties,	is	still	highly	unsta-
ble. The leader of the PDM, although he clearly 
far outdoes the President in the scale of his in-
fluence	and	financial	resources,	and	is	probably	
in possession of materials which would seri-
ously compromise him, is aware of the threat 
posed to him by this ambitious and popular 
politician. For this reason Plahotniuc, although 
he has been forced to cooperate with Dodon, 
has also taken action aimed at limiting his pow-
ers and room for manoeuvre. Back in Decem-
ber 2016, the Democrats took control from the 
President of the country’s central intelligence 
organisation, the Information and Security Ser-
8 Investigative journalists in Moldova have highlighted 
this: http://jurnal.md/ro/politic/2016/11/8/spunem-do-
don-subintelegem-plahotniuc-liderul-psrm-parten-
erul-oligarhului-in-scheme-dubioase-si-colacul-de-sal-
vare-al-lui-plahotniuc/
Both the President and Plahotniuc have to 
maintain the functioning clan-oligarchic 
system which operates in the country.
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vice (SIS)9.	Plahotniuc	also	managed	to	fill	 the	
position of the Attorney General with his own 
candidate. The most striking example of this 
practice, however, was the decision in October 
2017 by the Constitutional Court (controlled by 
Plahotniuc) which made it possible to suspend 
the President’s rights in a situation where he 
refuses to appoint candidates approved by par-
liament to their respective ministries, or when 
he twice refuses to sign laws which have been 
adopted by parliament. The role of the Presi-
dent, until the contested acts have been signed, 
will be taken by the Prime Minister or the speak-
er of parliament (both of whom are trusted 
subordinates of Plahotniuc). This legally strange 
solution has already been applied three times. 
Suspending the President in the performance 
of his duties is an extremely convenient form 
of evasion, not only because it allows for the 
adoption of laws or changes in personnel 
which might be inconvenient (politically and 
personally) to the President, but more impor-
tantly, because they prevent Dodon from trying 
to force the government to initiating the im-
peachment process. Paradoxically, such a move 
would strengthen the President’s position, as 
removing the head of state requires a referen-
dum, which would clearly keep Dodon in power 
and boost his legitimacy.
Igor	Dodon	has	not	responded	in	any	firm	way	
to the limitation of his powers. Apart from his 
open criticism of the government and the PDM 
(although rather not of Plahotniuc himself, 
which is indicative), he has not moved to or-
ganise any mass protest actions, for example, 
9 http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/sib-perehodit-pod- 
parlamentskiy-kontrol-28787
or any other attempts at resistance. On the con-
trary, the President has regularly emphasised 
that those who are guilty of actions which do 
not comply with the rule of law will be duly 
punished after the parliamentary elections. 
Moreover, Dodon has used the actions target-
ed at him to burnish his own image. He is able 
to present himself as a victim of the oligarchic 
apparatus of state, and explain his ineffective-
ness as an inability to act. This passivity in the 
President is further proof of the existence of 
a temporary agreement between him and Pla-
hotniuc. Dodon does not want to challenge the 
oligarch at this time, and is waiting to see how 
the situation develops, particularly with regard 
to the results of the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. 
Plahotniuc’s strategy to retain power
In addition to the above-mentioned political 
actions, Plahotniuc is conducting an intensive 
campaign to improve the abysmal poll ratings 
of the PDM and himself personally. At the end 
of	2016	he	officially	 took	over	 the	position	of	
chairman of the party (having previously held 
the post of deputy leader)10. At the same time, 
taking advantage of his new position, he began 
to	 participate	 in	 official	 government	 delega-
tions much more freely than before (including 
trips to Brussels, Strasbourg and Washington). 
The TV stations he owns have emphasised that 
he has been received by high-ranking foreign 
politicians, which increases his legitimacy to 
govern and builds up his image as a statesman. 
Plahotniuc is also making more public appear-
ances	in	Moldova,	including	press	briefings	dur-
ing which he personally Initialises new reforms, 
sets	 policies,	 announces	 staffing	 changes	 in	
the government, or announces actions popular 
with the public. At the same time, the anti-cor-
ruption bodies subordinate to him have dis-
10 https://www.zdg.md/stiri/stiri-politice/ultima-ora-vlad-
plahotniuc-este-noul-presedinte-al-pdm
Dodon serves Plahotniuc both as a liaison 
and a mediator, facilitating contacts with 
the world of Russian business and politics.
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played	an	unusual	intensification	in	their	activi-
ty. It has become common to see investigations 
being initiated, as well as arrests of high-rank-
ing	Moldovan	officials	or	politicians	(which	had	
previously been rather rare). Although the gov-
ernment media portray this as a sign that the 
political system is being cleaned up, these ac-
tivities are in fact designed (apart from having 
the desired effect on the public) to get rid of 
Plahotniuc’s political opponents11.
At the same time, Plahotniuc has been using 
the services of at least three lobbying com-
panies to improve his image (especially with 
regard to building up his position abroad): 
the well-known American company the Po-
desta Group, and the Prime Policy Group and 
Cornerstone Government Affairs12. These com-
panies	have	arranged	official	meetings	for	him	
with representatives of the US government in 
Washington (mostly second-tier congressmen 
and senators). As mentioned earlier, Plahotni-
uc is trying to convince the EU and the US that 
he is the only major player on the Moldovan 
political arena capable of stopping pro-Rus-
sian groups from coming to power. To do this 
(in addition to the methods listed already), he 
regularly places articles in well-known interna-
tional media such as Politico or the Wall Street 
Journal, in which he and other senior members 
11 Proof of this is that the people arrested have long been 
enemies of Plahotniuc. They include Petru Lucinschi, 
a senior politician in the PLDM, Vlad Filat’s party, and 
also the owner of a TV station unfavourable to Plahotni-
uc;	and	Dorin	Chirtoaca,	mayor	of	Chişinău	and	deputy	
head of the Liberal Party, which until recently was con-
sidered as a satellite to the PDM, but did not support 
changes to the electoral system which would have fa-
voured the PDM.
12 http://totul.md/news/tretja-ne-lishnjaja-stalo-izvest-
no-o-kontrakte-dempartii-s-eshhe-odnoj-lobbist-
skoj-kompaniej-iz-ssha/
of the government, such as the prime minister 
or the speaker of parliament13, speak about the 
growing threat from Moscow and Moldova’s 
need for support from the West in order to 
maintain its pro-European course. This type of 
provocative behaviour towards Russia is also in-
tended to emphasise the pro-Western nature of 
the Moldovan government. The plan to include 
a clause strengthening the country’s pro-Euro-
pean political course in the Moldovan constitu-
tion should also be seen in this context14.
Post-election prospects
The system operating in Moldova today re-
sembles a kind of top-down political theatre, 
in which the lead actors play out roles which 
are unrelated in any way with their authentic 
beliefs and views before a national and inter-
national audience. Due to the tension between 
the main characters (Plahotniuc and Dodon), 
this model can only continue in the short term. 
The moment which will decide its future form is 
the upcoming parliamentary elections. Because 
of their importance to Plahotniuc’s regime and 
his fear of a boost in Dodon’s position, it is 
almost certain that these will be some of the 
most opaque and deeply manipulated elections 
since 1991. All the indications are that, despite 
his extensive publicity and political activities, 
Plahotniuc’s party is not guaranteed a good re-
sult (it is currently teetering on the border of 
the 6-percent electoral threshold), still less that 
the PDM will win a majority enabling it to retain 
power.
Although	it	is	difficult	to	conclusively	predict	the	
development of events in the coming months, 
it now seems that one of the more likely scenar-
ios Plahotniuc is considering is an attempt to 
get the best possible result for the PDM while 
simultaneously taking action (including admin-
13 Although these articles have appeared under Plahotni-
uc’s name, Prime Minister Pavel Filip and the speaker 
of parliament Andriana Candu, they have undoubtedly 
been prepared by specialist ghostwriters.
14 http://www.noi.md/ru/news_id/259521
All the indications are that, despite the 
extensive publicity and political activi-
ties, Plahotniuc’s party is not guaranteed 
a good result in the elections.
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istrative moves) to limit the number of votes for 
the PSRM. In such a situation, it cannot be ruled 
out that Plahotniuc will work to form a coalition 
between the PDM and its satellite parties with 
the pro-European opposition (principally the Ac-
tion and Solidarity Party (PAS) of Maia Sandu, 
which is currently supported by around 25% of 
the electorate)15 or the Socialists. In this situa-
15 Sandu has categorically ruled out any coalition with the 
PDM. However, if the Socialists achieve a very good elec-
toral result, they may come under a great deal of pres-
sure, especially from those Western partners (including 
Romania) for whom Igor Dodon’s group coming to power 
would not be in their interest.
tion, the oligarch will try (as he has done in the 
past) to gradually marginalise his coalition part-
ners and, by means of bribery and threats, bring 
deputies from Sandu’s party and the Socialists 
over to the PDM.
The coming months will be decisive for the shape 
of Moldovan politics and for Plahotniuc himself. 
The future of the oligarchy and the system it has 
constructed is currently uncertain, and depends 
equally on the results of the general elections, 
and	 the	 degree	 of	 the	 oligarch’s	 influence	 on	
President	Dodon,	which	is	difficult	to	assess	un-
ambiguously.
